The Eubank (2012, JDS) findings on taxation, political accountability and foreign aid has had an important influence in academic and policy-making debates. Eubank has warned that his findings should not be generalized across Africa until they are backed by robust empirical evidence. This paper puts some empirical structure to the celebrated literature. The empirical evidence which is based on data from 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 broadly confirms the Somaliland-based Eubank (2012) hypothesis that in the absence of foreign aid, the dependence of government on local tax revenues provides the leverage for better political governance.
Introduction
One of the root causes of Africa's poverty has been attributed to the poor quality of institutions: political instability, hostile regulatory environment for investment, high corruption, lack of property rights, weak courts and contract enforcements (Easterly, 2005) .
Consistent with this narrative, for poverty to be eradicated in the continent, developed nations need to promote credible political governance and institutions (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005; Jellal & Bouzahzah, 2012; Asongu, 2012ab,2013a Asongu & Jellal, 2013) . For over half a century, the foreign aid literature has centered around three main themes. First, there is a concern of if development assistance is allocated more to undeveloped countries with better institutions. Second, there is the issue of how institutional quality is affected by foreign aid. Third, there is another concern of the instrumentality of foreign aid in the quality of government. In other words, the manner in which development assistance donors can utilize aid to improve institutions.
The nexus between taxation and political governance which has been substantially debated in the foreign aid literature falls within the second strand of the literature. Accordingly, concerns have been consistently raised as to whether foreign aid improves institutions in Africa. Given that foreign aid in certain African countries far exceeds government expenditure and that the former mitigates government dependency on tax revenues, the role of foreign aid in the quality of institutions (especially political governance) has been an important concern in academic and policy making circles (Eubank, 2012) . While the positive nexus between tax dependency and political accountability has been established (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004) , the effect of foreign aid on institutional quality has been an object of heated debate (Brautigam & Knack, 2004) especially in recent African aid literature (Jellal & Asongu, 2013) . This paper focuses on the second strand in light of the celebrated whether the Somaliland-based findings are reflected across Africa. This is specifically because a caveat to the paper has clearly outlined that the findings should not be extended to the entire African continent without empirical evidence. Second, the intuition that the dependence of the government on tax income produces an income channel of accountability has not been substantially covered in recent development literature. While a lot has been covered on the appeals of good governance in social and economic development, current knowledge on the driving forces behind government quality has remained limited. In this quest, an important number of researchers have focused on the relationship between taxation and political accountability in an attempt to understand drivers of representative and accountable governments (Moore, 2008; Mahon, 2004; Morton, 1994; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009) . Thirdly, assessing the problem statement is a unique opportunity of extending the recent debate on the effect of foreign aid on institutional quality that is particularly relevant in the African continent 4 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the theoretical underpinnings. Data and Methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 3.
The empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical and empirical highlights
In accordance with Eubank (2012) , the theoretical underpinnings largely draw from the dependency on local revenues by the government. In exchange of tax income, it makes political concessions in terms of accountability. Indeed, taxation genuinely comes with compromise in political representation (e.g 'no taxation without representation') and gives 2012, p.1). 4 For more insights into the heated debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption please refer to Okada & Samreth (2012) , Asongu (2012a Asongu ( , 2013a Asongu ( , 2014a , Asongu & Jellal (2013) . In essence, Asongu (2012a) has questioned the relevance of the Okada & Samreth (2012) findings in Africa. He has also responded to criticisms arising to further validate his findings from conditional (Asongu, 2013a (Asongu, , 2014a and indirect channels (Asongu & Jellal, 2013 While the inherent nexus between revenue bargaining and political accountability has been covered in the empirical literature (Moore, 2008; Mahon, 2004; Morton, 1994; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009) , the absence of a study that has focused on the entire African continent offers a unique opportunity of assessing the Eubank hypothesis. Accordingly, the number of studies that have focused on the problem statement have concluded that aid should be limited in Africa and the continent left to follow its own development course (Morton, 1994) . Evidence of revenue bargaining in exchange for accountability has been found in Latin America (Mahon, 2004) . Consistent with Timmons (2005) , greater dependence of the state on taxing the richer faction of the population (the general population) leads to more enforcement of property rights (provision of basic services). This empirical evidence is broadly supported by Mahon (2005) who has established that the more a government depends on tax revenues, the better are democratic institutions. A thesis supported in China by Bernstein & Lu (2008) ; in contemporary developing countries by Moore (2008) and in Ghana (Prichard, 2009 ).
Data and Methodology

Data
Dependent, independent and control variables
We examine a panel of 53 African countries with data from the World Bank Development indicators for the period 1996-2010. The periodicity is selected because data on political governance and accountability from the World Bank is only available from 1996.
Consistent with the underpinnings of Eubank's hypotheses, the dependent variable is political governance. According to Kaufmann et al. (2010) the concept of political governance can be appreciated in terms of voice & accountability and political stability as has been recently employed in African institutional literature . To the variables above, we add a composite indicator of political governance for more subtlety and robustness.
The procedure for deriving this composite indicator is discussed in Section 3.2.1 below.
The main Aid independent variable is Official Development Assistance (ODA) in line with recent literature (Asongu, 2012a (Asongu, , 2013a Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu & Jellal, 2013) . For robustness purposes we use three main ODA variables: Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from Multilateral Donors (MD), and NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. While the first and third are used in alternative specifications in the empirical section, the second is used for further robustness purposes to check the consistency of the results across specifications. Tax income is measured in terms of Total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP (Jellal & Asongu, 2013) . We control for press freedom, inflation and public investment in accordance with the Aid literature. In essence, the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms have been considerably covered in the literature (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Reichel, 1995; Boone, 1996; Addison et al., 2005; Gomane et al., 2003; Mosley et al., 2004 ; Larrain & Tavares, 2004; Easterly, 2005; Bird, 2007; Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008; Benedek et al., 2012; Morrissey, 2012; Jellal & Asongu, 2013) . We also account for the unobserved heterogeneity by taking into account income-levels, legal origins, religious dominations, openness to sea, resource-dependency and conflict-affected features. The criteria used in the selection of these latter set of control variables is discussed in Section 3.1.2 below.
Controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity
It is also worthwhile to discuss the criteria for the selection of the dummy variables used in controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity because rightly categorizing them is necessary for relevance of the empirics and quality of ensuing policy implications. It has already been firmly established that macroeconomic characteristics and other government quality indicators have the drawback of being time-dynamic. Therefore, non-dummy thresholds may be inconsistent given the 15 year time-span. This interesting thesis is even more correct when short-run (or business cycle) disturbances loom considerably. Hence, the categorizations are consistent with recent African institutional literature which has classified the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of income-levels, political stability, religious domination, legal origins, natural resources and openness to sea (Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2014b) .
First, in the categorization of conflict-affected countries some issues could arise because of the difficulty in assigning countries within this strand in an exclusive and nonarbitrary manner. Assignment of countries should be made in terms of significance in and rate of instability in the period with respect to the overall data length because it is unrealistic for any country to be completely free from conflict. We discuss this strand in two levels: civil conflicts and political strife. With contemporary stylized facts in mind, it would be difficult to object to the inclusion of the following countries in the first strand: Angola (1975 Angola ( -2002 , Burundi (1993 Burundi ( -2005 (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . With regard to the second-strand, despite the absence of characteristics of formal civil war, Nigeria and Zimbabwe could be included due to their severity in internal strife.
Second, in the categorization of petroleum-exporting countries, several issues also arise.
(1) Some countries that export oil could also be politically unstable. In this classification, a country may be situated in many classes at the same time because we impose no constraints of priority. Hence, a country may fit into more than one strand as long as it has the requisite features that are relevant to the category. (2) The qualification in this category of some countries could be time-dynamic owing to: (a) substantial decline in oil exports and; (b) recent discovery of petroleum. (3) Some countries have macroeconomic features that are the same with petroleum exporting countries (e.g Botswana). To the last-two issues above, we take a minimalistic view by: (a) including only countries whose exports have been petroleumdominated for more than 10 years in the sampled periodicity and; (b) restricting this resourcecategory exclusively to petroleum-exporting countries. In light of the above criteria, the following countries are selected: Angola, Algeria, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Nigeria, Gabon and Sudan.
Third, the intuition of colonial legacy is deeply rooted in the law literature: the substantially documented relationship between legal origins and institutional quality (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999) which has been confirmed in recent African literature (Asongu, 2014c) . Classification of this strand is consistent with La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289) .
Fourth, controlling for the unobserved wealth-effects is relevant for two reasons: (1) Economic prosperity could substantially affected changes in political governance and; (2) wealth-effects have recently been documented to be instrumental in the quality of government in Africa (Asongu, 2012b; Asongu, 2014d Fifth, there could be an institutional cost of being landlocked. Countries that are closed to the sea could have a higher propensity to lower political governance (Arvis et al., 2007) .
Sixth, recent African literature has also established the role of religious domination in institutional quality (Asongu, 2012b, p. 191 ). This classification is in accordance with the Central Intelligence Agency's (2011) World Fact book.
Information on variable definitions (and corresponding sources), summary statistics and correlation analysis are detailed in Appendix 3, Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively.
The summary statistics shows that reasonable estimated nexuses could emerge because there is quite a degree of variation in the variables. The correlation analysis: (1) mitigates issues in overidentification and multicollinearity in the same specification and; (2) validates the degree of substitution in foreign aid and political governance indicators used for robustness purposes.
The categorization of countries is summarized in Appendix 4.
Methodology
Principal component analysis
Due to the high degree of correlation between the political governance indicators (voice & accountability and political stability), some information could be redundant. Hence, we employ Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensions of components in the political governance measures. This is a widely employed method used to reduce a large set of correlated indicators into a smaller set of uncorrelated measures called principal components (PCs) that represent a great proportion of the information in the dataset. To reduce the political governance indicators into a single variable, the criterion adopted to retain the common factor is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) . Consistent with Asongu (2013b), it has been advised that only PCs with an eigenvalue greater than one should be selected. Hence, the first PC in Table 1 is appropriate because it has an eigenvalue of 1.659
and represents more than 82% of information. Therefore the first PC is our political governance indicator. 
Estimation technique
In accordance with Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine (2008), dynamic panel estimations have many advantages and one principal shortcoming when compared with other cross-country analysis (Asongu, 2013b) . From the appealing side of it, two points are worth noting. First, both time-series and cross-sectional differences in the dataset are accounted for. Second, since the unobserved country-specific effect is part of the error term, in cross-country regressions estimation coefficients could be biased due to correlations between the independent variables and the error term. Moreover, in dynamic equations when the lagged dependent variables are employed, the regressors are most probably correlated with the country-specific effects. Firstdifferencing can be used to control for the unobserved country-specific effect. Then, instrumental variables are used to account for endogeneity. Hence, the control for endogeneity is the second appealing feature of dynamic panel estimations. This is essentially because misleading inferences and unhealthy policy recommendations could be due to biased estimates.
On the other hand, the main shortcoming in this approach is that the use of dataaverages (shorter time spans) means that estimated coefficients should be treated as shortterm impacts and not long-run effects. However, this disadvantage is not a major concern in the present study because we are not employing data averages since one of the conditions of using the GMM estimation strategy is fully satisfied: N>T (53>15).
The dynamic panel regression model is presented as follows:
Where 't' represents the period and 'i' stands for a country.
PG Borrowing from Asongu (2013b) , the estimates will be unbiased only if the independent variables exhibit strict exogeneity. In the real world, this is unfortunately not the case for three main reasons: (1) while the independent variables have an incidence on political governance, the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out since political governance also determines independent variables (the amount of aid decision by Donors, public investment…etc) ; (2) the error term ( This implies, the concern of endogeneity still emerges due to endogenous regressors. A strategy of dealing with this concern of the correlation between individual specific-effects and endogenous variables consists of eliminating the individual-effects by first differencing.
Therefore Eq (1) becomes:
Estimation Eq. (2) above by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) still presents biased estimates because there remains a correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. This issue arising can be handled by jointly estimating the regression in differences with those in levels, hence exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the error term and the lagged endogenous variables. We use both the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) The two-step option is chosen instead of the one-step (homoscedascity consistent) in the specification of the GMM because it corrects for heteroscedasticity. In validating the models, we use two tests: the autocorrelation test for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals and the Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) for the validity of the instruments.
In summary, the main arguments for using dynamic system GMM estimations are that, it: (1) does not eliminate cross-country differences; (2) controls for the endogeneity and; (3) mitigates biases of the difference estimator in small samples.
5 "We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998 
Empirical analysis, discussion and policy implications
Presentation of results
This section assesses three main issues: the effect of foreign aid on political governance; the incidence of tax revenues on the dependent variables and; the combined effect of 'taxation and aid' on political governance. Tables 2-3 below present the empirical findings. While Table 2 is based on Aid from the DAC countries with the Difference GMM estimation strategy, Table 3 focuses on Total aid with the System GMM estimation strategy for robustness. We further use the Aid from Multilateral Donors to confirm findings in Tables   2-3 for further robustness purposes but do not provide them due to space constraints. For both tables, the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests broadly validate the models in terms of absence of autocorrelation in the residuals and quality of the instruments respectively 6 .
Based on the findings of Table 2 , the following could be established. First, foreign aid mitigates voice & accountability though the effect is not significant for political stability and political governance. The significant effect should be treated with caution because there is still some evidence of autocorrelation in the residuals (significant AR(2) test). Second, the effect of taxation on political stability and governance is significantly consistent across the first (political stability) and third (political governance) specifications. Third, the combined effect of 'taxation and aid' is negative, implying that more aid mitigates the positive effect of taxation on political governance. Fourth, the significant control variables have the expected signs.
(1) Press freedom increases political governance. In interpreting the sign of the press-6 As highlighted in the methodology section, two tests are performed in order to assess the validity of the models; notably the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation that investigates the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation and the Sargan-test which examines the over-identification restrictions. In essence, the latter test investigates if instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that the instruments as a group are strictly exogenous. With respect to the former test, the AR(2) in first difference is instead reported because it is more relevant than the AR(1) that assesses autocorrelation in levels. Accordingly, for most of the estimated models, neither the null hypothesis of the Sargan for the validity of the instruments nor that of the AR(2) for the absence of autocorrelation are overwhelmingly rejected.
freedom estimates, it should be noted that, Freedom House from which the data is taken presents freedom of the press in decreasing magnitudes, such that countries which enjoy the highest press-freedom level have the least values (Andrés & Asongu, 2013, p. 674 ) . (2) While inflation is intuitively detrimental to the quality of institutions, public investment that is not tainted by corrupt practices could improve them. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. n.s.a: not specifically applicable due to OIR test (or instrument) constraints.
Owing to substantial constraints in the instruments required for Sargan OIR, specifications in Table 2 do not entirely control for some of the documented unobserved heterogeneity, as shown by the non-specifically applicable (nsa) signs. Hence to tackle this concern with employ the system GMM estimation strategy in Table 3 because it: (1) corrects the biases in the difference estimator; (2) adds lag differences of the regressors as instruments in the level equation, hence exploiting all the orthogonality conditions needed for endogeneity-robust estimations and; (3) uses Total aid instead of aid from DAC countries for more robustness purposes. Table 3 below incorporates the points highlighted above. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.
From the findings in Table 3 above, the following conclusions could be established.
First, the incidence of foreign aid is not significantly negative. This is contrary to the wealth of recent empirical literature that has firmly established a negative aid-institutions nexus in the African continent (Asongu, 2012a (Asongu, , 2013a (Asongu, , 2014a . Second, the effect of taxation on political stability and governance is significantly consistent across the first (political stability) and third (political governance) specifications. Third, the combined effect of 'taxation and aid' is negative, implying that more aid mitigates the positive effect of taxation on political governance. Fourth, the significant control variables have the expected signs.
(1) Press freedom increases political governance. (2) Islam-dominated and conflict-affected countries intuitively have less voice & accountability and political stability respectively.
Further discussion of results and policy implications
Before diving into the discussion of results it important to briefly highlight the spirit motivating this paper. Eubank has warned that the Somaliland-based findings should not be generalized across Africa until his hypothesis is substantiated with robust empirical evidence.
The discussion should neither be construed as an extension of the debate over the international recognition of Somaliland nor as a validation of the thesis of proponents against foreign aid in African countries. Essentially, the objective has been to assess Eubank's hypothesis in order to provide some empirical structure to a celebrated literature that has received the reward for best paper in the Journal of Development Studies for the year 2013.
The results broadly show that in the absence of aid, taxation improves political institutions in Africa while in the presence of aid, such institutions are deteriorated. This implies foreign aid is instrumental only when existing political institutions are already strong in the recipient country. The validation of Eubank's hypothesis further has four implications.
( (Moore, 2008; Mahon, 2004; Morton, 1994; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009 ).
Conclusion
The Eubank (2012, JDS) findings on taxation, political accountability and foreign aid has had an important influence in academic and policy-making debates. Eubank has warned that his findings should not be generalized across Africa until they are backed by robust empirical evidence. This paper has put some empirical structure to the celebrated literature.
The empirical evidence which is based on data from 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 has broadly confirmed the Somaliland-based Eubank (2012) hypothesis that in the absence of foreign aid, the dependence of government on local tax revenues provides the leverage for better political governance. 
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